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I am deeply grateful to Maŕıa José Ramirez, whose counseling allow me to focus and organize
my work, allowing me not only to finish my dissertation but also to enjoy doing it.
I am also very thankful to my friends and colleagues for their very helpful feedback and
advice: my husband Gent Bajraj, Meghna Brahmachari, Alejandra López, and Farhod
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Constanza Isabel Vergara Delgadillo
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde
Globalization, characterized as enhanced trade integration among countries, has make na-
tions vulnerable to forces emanating from their borders. The following essays contribute to
the understanding of how forces of globalization interact with national economies.
The first two chapters focus on a specific feature of globalization: the fragmentation of
the production process across borders. The first chapter finds a novel way of solving a
multistage version of Eaton and Kortum (2002)’s trade model, which contradicts previous
findings that trade barriers have a larger impact when, not only final goods are traded,
but also inputs along the production chain. Previous findings where based on unrealistic
assumptions, that in this chapter are not made.
The second chapter, estimates a multi-country version of the previous model, and evaluates
the impact on the distribution of welfare among countries of eliminating trade barriers.
The chapter concludes that when there is multistage production, eliminating trade barriers
carries an increase in welfare inequality, while a classical one-stage production/trade model
predicts a decrease in inequality.
The final chapter of this dissertation focus on the relationship between human capital and
the decision of whether to imitate foreign technologies or to innovate, in order to increase
productivity. The papers suggests that differences on human capital endowments, makes
technologies developed in advanced countries less productive in the developing world, and
therefore, the optimal decision for firms in less developed countries, is to create their own
technologies.
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CHAPTER 1 : ARE TRADE COSTS AMPLIFIED IN A STANDARD TRADE
MODEL WITH MULTISTAGE PRODUCTION?
1.1. Introduction
A large body of research has found that there is “too little international trade” to be
rationalized by standard trade models. As an example, Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)
finds that trade patterns between the United States and Canada can only be rationalized
by international trade costs of 91 percent, which is presumed to be excessive for the current
tariff levels and transport costs between the two countries. This phenomena has been called
“home bias puzzle”, and Yi (2010) attempts to explain this puzzle, using a multistage
production model. The intuition is that, when different stages are produced in different
countries, trade costs are incurred multiple times, as goods cross national borders while
they are in process. Then, the actual cost incurred in trading is a multiple of any existing
transport cost and or tariffs, and the optimal share of goods bought at home is larger that
the one implied by a one-stage model.
This paper shows that Yi (2010) makes assumptions that are not innocuous but rather
critical to the results. It concludes that a multistage production model does not result in
lower trade levels, but the opposite.
To reach this conclusion, a similar exercise than the one found in Yi (2010) is performed: a
second production stage is added to Eaton and Kortum (2002)’s model, and it is solved for
two symmetric countries, obtaining shares of traded varieties for each stage and for each
level of trade costs. These shares are compared with the shares that result in a one-stage
model.
The main difference between this paper and Yi (2010)’s, is the way in which the model is
solved. When adding stages, the model becomes more complex, and closed form, estimable
equations, like the ones derived in Eaton and Kortum (2002), do not arise. Yi (2010) reduces
1
the complexity of the problem by assuming that the first stage is produced in the country
that ultimately consumes the second (and final) stage. This assumption is not realistic,
and imposes double border crossing of goods whenever there are comparative advantages to
exploit. In this paper, Nadarajah (2005)’s findings are employed to reduce the complexities
of a multistage problem with two countries.
Additionally, when setting up the problem, Yi (2010) implicitly assumes that the parameter
that governs the heterogeneity of the draws in the first stage is a fraction of the equivalent
parameter in the second stage, which entails that the second stage has less variance than
the first one. This assumption is not embedded in the setup of this paper.
As a result of eliminating these two assumptions, this paper concludes that the “home bias
puzzle” is not solved by a multistage production model, but aggravated. A two stages
production process depends on two random variables, which introduces extra sources of
comparative advantage. As a result, a two-stages model predicts even lower shares of goods
bought at home than a one-stage model.
1.2. Model
The model used for the analysis is a multistage version of Eaton and Kortum (2002), more
specifically, a second stage is added to the production process. There are a continuum of
varieties indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. Each variety requires two stages of production: upstream
(k = 1) and downstream (k = 2). The model determines the share of varieties traded at
each stage of production.
Before presenting the equations that define the model, Figure 1 shows a diagram that
represents the production flow. An upstream variety zn is produced using labor and an
aggregate intermediate M . Then, the upstream variety zn along with labor, are used to
produce the downstream variety zn. Households consume only the downstream varieties,
and the aggregate intermediate is produced by compounding all upstream varieties.
2
Household
STAGE
1
STAGE
2
STAGE
1
STAGE
2
M
(intermediate)
labor
input
input
z1
input
zn
input
z1
input
zn
input
M
final good z1 final good zn
Figure 1: Production Model with 2-Stages
1.2.1. Household
The representative household in region i maximizes
Ui = exp
[∫ 1
0
log(xh2,i(z)) dz
]
(1.1)
subject to the budget constraint
∫ 1
0
c2,i(z)xh2,i(z) dz = Yi,
where xh2,i(z) is consumption of the downstream variety z in country i, c2,i(z) is the price,
inclusive of transport and border costs, that the household pays for a downstream variety
z, and Yi is income available for consumption.
1.2.2. Technology
The production function for the upstream variety in country i is
y1,i(z) = A1,i(z)l1,i(z)
1−θ1Mi(z)
θ1 z ∈ [0, 1], (1.2)
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and output of the downstream variety is
y2,i(z) = A2,i(z)l2,i(z)
1−θ2x21,i(z)
θ2 z ∈ [0, 1], (1.3)
where Ak,i(z) is productivity making the kth stage of variety z in country i, θk is the
intermediate share in stage k, lk,i is the labor input into the kth stage of variety z in
country i, Mi(z) is the input of the composite intermediate into the upstream variety z in
country i, where
Mi = exp
[∫ 1
0
log(xM1,i(z)) dz
]
, (1.4)
x21,i(z) is the input of the upstream of variety into downstream production of variety z, and
xM1,i(z) is the input of upstream variety z into country i’s composite intermediate. Total
use of upstream variety z by country i is:
x1,i(z) = x21,i(z) + xM1,i(z),
the sum of what is used in it’s downstream conjugate and what is used in creating country
i’s composite intermediate.
The Ak,i(z)’s are realization of Fréchet random variables drawn from the distributions
Fk,i(ak,i) = Pr [Ak,i(z) ≤ ak,i] = exp
(
−Tk,ia−nkk,i
)
,
where Tk,i > 0 is the scale parameter, and nk > 1 is the shape parameter. The mean of Ak,i
is increasing in Tk,i, and nk governs the heterogeneity of the draws from the productivity
distribution. The larger nk is, the lower the heterogeneity or variance of Ak,i.
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1.2.3. Equilibrium
All factor and goods markets are characterized by perfect competition. The following market
clearing conditions hold for each region.
Market equilibrium condition for the upstream variety z implies
y1(z) ≡
I∑
i=1
y1,i(z) =
I∑
i=1
d1,i(z)x1,i(z), (1.5)
where dk,i(z) is the total trade cost incurred by shipping stage k variety from its cheapest
production location to region i. A similar set of conditions applies to the downstream
variety:
y2(z) ≡
I∑
i=1
y2,i(z) =
I∑
i=1
d2,i(z)xh2,i(z). (1.6)
In each region, aggregate intermediate must be completely used,
Mi =
∫ 1
0
Mi(z) dz. (1.7)
and labor market clears:
Li =
∫ 1
0
l1,i(z) + l2,i(z) dz, (1.8)
where Li is labor force in country i.
An equilibrium is a sequence of varieties, factor prices, and quantities, such that the first-
order conditions to the households’ maximization problem in equation (1.1) and firms’
maximization problem, associated with technologies (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4), as well as the
market clearing conditions (1.5), (1.6), (1.7), and (1.8) are satisfied.
1.3. Share of Upstream Varieties Traded
All stages of production are subject to perfect competition, which implies that the price that
a firm pays for the upstream variety is equal to its cost in the final destination. Geographic
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barriers are assumed to be of the iceberg type, which means that delivering a stage k variety
from country i to country j, requires producing dk,ij units in i.
Cost minimization for the firm associated with technology (1.2), implies that the unit cost
of an upstream variety z, if produced in country i and delivered to country j, is given by
c1,ji(z) =
d1,jic1,i
A1,i(z)
, (1.9)
where c1,i is the input cost of producing the upstream varieties in country i, given by
c1,i = ψ1(wi)
1−θ1(Pi)
θ1 , (1.10)
where wi is the wage in country i, Pi is the cost of the composite intermediate there, and
ψk = θ
−θk
k (1− θk)
−(1−θk). Hence, the distribution of costs for upstream varieties that i can
deliver to destination j is
Pr [C1,ji ≤ c] = Pr
[
A1,i(z) ≥
d1,jic1,i
c
]
,
= 1− exp
[
−T1,i (d1,jic1,i)−n1 cn1
]
,
= 1− exp [−Φ1,jicn1 ] , (1.11)
where Φ1,ji = T1,i (d1,jic1,i)
−n1 . The expression T1,i (d1,jic1,i)
−n1 represents the technology
available in j from i, discounted by input costs and geographic barriers.
Destination j will use the lowest cost version of upstream variety z, which means that the
cost of the upstream variety in country j is equal to
c1,j(z) = min
i
{c1,ji(z)} . (1.12)
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The distribution of c1,j(z) is given by
G1,j(c) = Pr [C1,j ≤ c] ,
= 1−ΠIi=1 Pr [C1,ji ≥ c] ,
= 1− exp (−Φ1,jcn1) ,
where
Φj =
I∑
i=1
Φ1,ji. (1.13)
The parameter Φj summarizes how states of technology and input costs around the world,
along with geographic barriers, govern the cost of upstream inputs in country j.
The probability that country i is the lowest cost source for j is
π1,ji = Pr
[
C1,ji ≤ min
s
{c1,js(z); s 6= j}
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Πs 6=i (1− Pr [C1,js ≤ c)]× Pr [C1,ji = c] dc
= Φ1,jin1
∫ ∞
0
ΠIs=1 exp [−Φ1,jscn1 ]× cn1−1 dc
= Φ1,jin1
∫ ∞
0
cn1−1 exp
[
−cn1
I∑
s=1
Φ1,js
]
dc
=
Φ1,ji
Φ1,j
(1.14)
Since there is a continuum of varieties, (1.14) is also the fraction of upstream varieties that
country j buys from i.
In order to compare with Yi (2010)’s results, consider an economy with two symmetric
countries: home (H) and foreign (F). The iceberg transport cost between the two countries
are assumed to be symmetric (dk = dk,HF = dk,FH), and are assumed to be non-existent
within the country (dk,HH = dk,FF = 1). Countries are assumed to have symmetric tech-
nology levels (Tk = Tk,H = Tk,F ) and input costs of producing the upstream variety (i.e.
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c1 = c1,H = c1,F ), so that Φ1 = Φ1,H = Φ1,H . For this particular case, the share of upstream
varieties bought by the Home country at Home is given by
π1,HH = 1−
1
dn11 + 1
. (1.15)
Up to this point, the model behaves just like Eaton and Kortum (2002), which means that
equation (1.15) also describes the share of goods bought at home in a one-stage model
(πHH) with symmetric countries, iceberg transport costs d1, and shape parameter n1:
πHH = π1,HH . (1.16)
1.4. Share of Downstream Varieties
Zero profit condition for the downstream variety implies that, the price that a consumer
pays for a stage 2 variety is equal to its cost in the final destination. The unit cost of
downstream variety z if produced in country i and delivered to destination j (with iceberg
transport cost d2,ij) is
c2,ji(z) =
ψ2d2,jiw
1−θ2
i c
θ2
1,i
A2,i(z)
. (1.17)
Considering the two-country symmetric case, the probability that the downstream variety
z is bought at home, for a given set of costs for the upstream variety (c1,H(z), c1,F (z)), is
the probability that
π2,HH (z|c1,H(z), c1,F (z)) = Pr [C2,HH(z) ≤ C2,FH(z)|c1,H(z), c1,F (z)] ,
= Pr
[
ψ2d2w
1−θ2cθ21,H(z)
A2,H(z)
≤
ψ2w
1−θ2cθ21,F (z)
A2,F (z)
∣∣∣c1,H(z), c1,F (z)] ,
= 1− Pr
[
A2,H(z)
A2,F (z)
≤ 1
d2
(
c1,H(z)
c1,F (z)
)θ2 ∣∣∣c1,H(z), c1,F (z)] ,
= 1− Pr
[
A2,H(z)
A2,F (z)
≤ D(z)
∣∣∣c1,H(z), c1,F (z)] ,
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where D(z) = 1d2
(
c1,H(z)
c1,F (z)
)θ2
. Notice that symmetry does not imply that the upstream input
cost for variety z bought in each country is the same, that is c1,H(z) 6= c1,F (z). The cost of
labor and the aggregate intermediate is the same, but for each variety z the firm is going
to choose where is cheapest to buy the upstream input.
Solving for the ratio of the productivities gives,
Pr
[
A2,H
A2,F
≤ D(z)
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr [A2,H ≤ D(z)a2,F |a2,F ] dF (a2,F ),
= T2n2
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−T2a−n22,F (D(z)
−n2 + 1)
)
a−n2−12,F da2,F ,
=
1
D(z)−n2 + 1
,
=
1
dn22
(
c1,H(z)
c1,F (z)
)−n2θ2
+ 1
.
Hence, the conditional probability that the downstream variety z is bought at home is given
by
π2,HH (z|c1,H(z), c1,F (z)) = 1−
1
dn22
(
c1,H(z)
c1,F (z)
)−n2θ2
+ 1
(1.18)
1.5. Yi (2010)’s Results and Assumptions
At this point of the model the derivation differs from Yi (2010)’s. Before presenting the
unconditional share of varieties bought at home in a two-stages model, the results and
assumptions from Yi (2010) are presented, in order to make a clear exposition of the differ-
ences.
Consider the case where the productivities of both stages have the same dispersion (n =
n1 = n2), and iceberg transport costs are the same for both stages (d = d1 = d2). In order
to solve equation (1.18), Yi (2010) assumes that the first stage is produced in the country
that ultimately consumes the final good. This assumption is making the decision of where
to buy the upstream input, exogenous.
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By making this assumption he finds that the fraction of downstream varieties bought at
home1 is given by
πYi2,HH = 1−
1
d
n
1+θ2
1−θ2 + 1
,
which is larger than the equivalent fraction in the one-stage model, defined in (1.16),
πHH = 1−
1
dn + 1
,
since 1+θ21−θ2 > 1
2. As a result, he concludes that in a two-stages production model, the
optimal fraction of goods bought at home is larger than in a standard one-stage model, and
therefore, the “Home bias puzzle” can be solved by correctly specifying the model.
To get this result, Yi (2010) also specifies a different productivity function for the down-
stream variety. In equation (2) of Yi (2010), the production function of the downstream
variety is defined as
yYi2,i = [A2,i(z)l2,i(z)]
1−θ2x21,i(z)
θ2 z ∈ [0, 1], (1.19)
and the cumulative distribution of the productivities as
Fk,i(ak,i) = Pr [Ak,i(z) ≤ ak,i] = exp
(
−Tk,ia−nk,i
)
k = 1, 2.
The shape parameter that governs the heterogeneity of the draws is the same for A1 and
A2, but the productivity of the downstream variety is equal to A2,i(z)
1−θ2 , and therefore
has a cumulative distribution of
F2,i
(
a1−θ22,i
)
= exp
(
−Tk,ia
− n
1−θ2
2,i
)
.
This is a Fréchet distribution, with shape parameter equal to n1−θ2 > n. This condition
1This expression is shown in equation (23) of Yi (2010).
2Recall that θ2 ∈ (0, 1) is the share of intermediates in the production function of the downstream variety.
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implies that the second stage has lower heterogeneity than the first stage, which means that
there is a weaker force for trade in the downstream variety. In other words, when there is
less variability, there are less incentives to buy across borders, and trade costs exert larger
resistance against commerce.
When the production function of the downstream function is specified with the same shape
parameter as the upstream production function, the share of downstream varieties bought
at home, when the source of the upstream input is exogenous, is equal to
1− 1
dn(1+θ2) + 1
,
which is still larger than πHH . By eliminating the assumption that the second stage has
lower dispersion than the first stage, the fraction of goods bought at home in a two stages
model is still larger than in a one-stage model, but the difference is smaller.
1.6. Endogenous solution of the Model
Recall equation (1.18), that defines the probability that the downstream variety z is bought
at home, conditional on upstream input costs used for production:
π2,HH (z|c1,H(z), c1,F (z)) = 1−
1
dn
(
c1,H(z)
c1,F (z)
)−nθ2
+ 1
.
Appendix A.1 shows that the function ν(z) ≡
(
c1,H(z)
c1,F (z)
)−nθ2
is the result of the product of
a Frechét and a Weibull distributions. The properties of the distribution of this product
are described in Nadarajah (2005), and when applied to solve equation (1.18), the deci-
sion of where to buy the upstream input can be made endogenous. Then, the fraction of
downstream varieties bought at home is given by
11
π2,HH =
∫ ∞
0
Pr [C2,HH ≤ C2,FH |ν] dF (ν) ,
= 1− 1
θ2
∫ ∞
0
1
dnν + 1
(ν)
1
θ2
−1[
1 + (ν)
1
θ2
]2 dν. (1.20)
Proposition 1 The share of downstream varieties bought at home, as defined in (1.20), is
smaller or equal to the share of upstream varieties bought at home, as defined in (1.15), i.e.
1− 1
θ2
∫ ∞
0
1
dnν + 1
(ν)
1
θ2
−1[
1 + (ν)
1
θ2
]2 dν ≤ 1− 1dn + 1 .
Proof : The proof follows from Theorem 1.14 in Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988): Let X
be a unimodal random variable. If max{X −m, 0} is stochastically larger than −min{X −
m, 0}, then X has a mode M satisfying M ≤ m ≤ µ, where m is defined as the median of
X, and µ is the mean of X.
Defining Z ≡ 1dnν+1 , appendix A.2 proves that Z is a unimodal random variable with
median m = 1dn+1 and mean µ =
1
θ2
∫∞
0
1
dn2 ν+1
(ν)
1
θ2
−1[
1+(ν)
1
θ2
]2 dν. Additionally, appendix A.2
proves that the max{Z − m, 0} is stochastically larger than the −min{Z − m, 0}, which
implies that µ ≥ m and 1− µ ≤ 1−m.
Corollary 1 A two-stages model would predict lower or equal shares of goods bought at
home than a one-stage model, for every d > 1. Hence, the “home bias” would be exacerbated
in a two-stages model.
Proof : By construction, the total share of goods bought at home in the one-stage model
is equal to the share of upstream varieties bought at home in the two-stages model (i.e.
πHH = π1,HH). In a two-stages model the total share of goods bought at home is a weighted
average of π1,HH and π2,HH , which together with Proposition 1, implies that the total share
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of goods bought at home in the two-stages model will be in the range (π2,HH , π1,HH). This
condition means that a one-stage model would predict shares of goods bought at home
larger than the ones predicted by a two-stages model.
As a result from Corollary 1, the “home bias puzzle” is not explained by a multistage
production model, but exacerbated: To explain the share of goods bought at home in a
two-stages model, it would be needed to have even larger trade costs than the ones implied
by a one-stage model. The random productivity of the second stage, adds heterogeneity to
the production process, increasing the source of comparative advantage, and making trade
more attractive.
1.7. A numerical example
To close the argument, Figure 2, 3, and 4 compare the relationship between trade costs and
the share of final goods bought a home in a one-stage model, relatively to the equivalent
share that results in a two-stages model, for different assumptions. Shape parameters are
assumed to be n = 3.6, and input shares of the second stage equal to θ2 = 0.7
3.
In Figure 2, the source of the upstream input for the production of the second stage is let
to be endogenous. The Figure shows that for any level of trade costs, a two stages model
predicts lower shares of final goods bought at home. Equivalently, for an observed share of
final goods bought at home of 90%, a one-stage model would predict a trade costs of 80%4,
while a two-stages model would predict trade costs of 110%.
Figure 3 adds a third line to Figure 2, showing the prediction of a two-stages model when
the source of the upstream input is exogenous, and determined by the location where the
final good is consumed. To simplify the exposition, the exogeneity assumption is defined as
“AY1”. In this case, for any trade cost, the share of final goods bought at home is larger
than in the one-stage model, and for an observed share of final goods bought at home of
3These values are in the range of the numbers used in the literature. See for example Eaton and Kortum
(2002). An input share of 0.7 is equivalent to a labor share of 0.3.
4Zero trade costs is equivalently of d = 1. Therefore, d′ = 1.8 can be interpreted as a trade cost of 80%.
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Figure 2: Shares of Final goods bought at home: One-stage, and Two-stages model with
endogenous source of upstream inputs.
90% a two-stages model would predict trade costs of 40%. In this example, it is clear that
multistage production does not explain the home bias, but the specific assumption that Yi
(2010) makes about where to buy the upstream input.
Finally, Figure 4 adds a fourth line that shows a two-stages model that assumes an exogenous
source of upstream input, and a modified production function as in equation (1.19). The
modified production function assumption, is defined as “AY2”. The share of final goods
bought at home is even larger than in the previous figure, because heterogeneity has been
reduced, and with that, the sources of comparative advantage.
1.8. Conclusion
This paper has shown that a multistage production model does not explain the “home bias
puzzle”, but moreover, exacerbates it. When the production chain has multiple stages, with
different productivity shocks, the sources of comparative advantage increase, making trade
more attractive than in standard one-stage trade model. Therefore, shares of goods bought
14
Figure 3: Shares of Final goods bought at home: One-stage model, and Two-stages model
with endogenous and exogenous source of upstream inputs.
Figure 4: Shares of Final goods bought at home: One-stage model, two-stages model with
endogenous and exogenous source of upstream inputs, and two-stages model with exogenous
source of upstream inputs a modified production function.
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at home in a multistage model would be smaller than the ones implied by a one-stage model,
and even larger trade costs would be necessary to rationalize the current levels observed.
Additionally, by applying the findings of Nadarajah (2005), this paper finds estimable equa-
tions for the trade shares of a two-stages model. Further exploration of this model, would
allow to expand the understanding of the implications of multistage production on trade
flows, and on the impact of globalization on welfare across nations.
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CHAPTER 2 : WELFARE, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND PATTERNS OF
VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION INA WORLD WITH
FRAGMENTED PRODUCTION PROCESS.
2.1. Introduction
A significant feature of the increased level of globalization is the fragmentation of the pro-
duction process across borders, allowing different countries to specialize in making particular
stages of a good. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) calls this phenomena vertical specialization,
and measures it as the proportion of imported goods that are used as inputs, to produce a
country’s export goods. Using this measure of vertical specialization, and the Input-Output
dabatabase produced by the OECD, the first section of this paper shows that a country’s
vertical specialization decreases when income increases. Moreover, the ratio of final goods
exported over the sum of final and intermediate goods exported, decreases when income
increases. Therefore, there is evidence that relatively high-income countries tend to spe-
cialize in early stages of production, while relatively low-income countries specialize in later
stages of production. This observation is consistent with the cases studied in Hummels,
Rapoport, and Yi (1998), in which relatively low-wage countries engage in final assembly,
and relatively high-wage countries engage in parts and components production. In this pa-
per, the consequences over the distribution of welfare among countries of this fragmentation
of production and specialization in stages, are studied.
The interest on welfare distribution among countries over other aspects that are affected
by trade, comes from the perception that some countries are on “the winning side” of trade
while others are on the “loosing side”. This belief has fueled the current backlash against
international trade. Understanding not only welfare consequences, but the distribution of
the gains of the trade, can help policy makers in designing deals that can be sustain over
time.
To study how eliminating trade barriers affects welfare distribution in the context of multi-
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stage production, the theoretical model that adds a second stage of production to the Eaton
and Kortum (2002)’s trade model outlined in Chapter 1, is extended for the multi-country
case, and is estimated. With the calibrated parameters in hand, this paper compares the
impact on welfare distribution when trade barriers are eliminated, in a two-stages model
versus an equivalent one-stage model.
First of all, it is important to notice that welfare gains are larger in a two-stages model.
In a two-stages model there are two sources of heterogeneity, coming from the productivity
process of each stage. This increased heterogeneity, increases the sources of comparative
advantage, and trade brings larger welfare gains.
Focusing on the analysis of welfare distribution, reducing trade barriers has the potential to
increase income inequality among participant countries in a multistage production model,
while in a one-stage model inequality decreases. The potential of increasing inequality in
the two-stages model depends on labor mobility. If full labor mobility is assumed, wages do
not change, and zero gravity brings price equality across nations. This equalization tends to
favors countries that had high production costs, which also tend to be the least productive
and poorest countries, which in turns leads to a decrease in inequality among nations in both
models (one-stage and two-stages). However, if labor is assumed to be immobile, changes in
the demand for goods would have heterogeneous impacts on wages. In the two-stages model,
the demand for inputs increases more than the demand for final goods, and therefore input
producers’ wages experiment larger increases. Since input producers tend to be high-income
countries, these are the countries that benefit the most from the increase in demand. When
labor is assumed to be immobile, this effect dominates over the price equalization effect,
leading to an increment on income inequality on the two stages model. In the one-stage
model, changes in wages are smaller and the price equalization effect dominates.
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Region Country
Australia and New Zealand Australia
Australia and New Zealand New Zealand
Central America Costa Rica
Central America Mexico
Eastern Asia Taiwan
Eastern Asia China
Eastern Asia China Hong Kong SAR
Eastern Asia Japan
Eastern Asia Rep. of Korea
Eastern Europe Bulgaria
Eastern Europe Czech Rep.
Eastern Europe Hungary
Eastern Europe Poland
Eastern Europe Romania
Eastern Europe Russian Federation
Eastern Europe Slovakia
Northern Africa Tunisia
Northern America Canada
Northern America USA
Northern Europe Denmark
Region Country
Northern Europe Estonia
Northern Europe Finland
Northern Europe Iceland
Northern Europe Ireland
Northern Europe Latvia
Northern Europe Lithuania
Northern Europe Norway
Northern Europe Sweden
Northern Europe United Kingdom
South-Eastern Asia Brunei Darussalam
South-Eastern Asia Cambodia
South-Eastern Asia Indonesia
South-Eastern Asia Malaysia
South-Eastern Asia Philippines
South-Eastern Asia Singapore
South-Eastern Asia Viet Nam
South-Eastern Asia Thailand
South America Argentina
South America Brazil
South America Chile
Region Country
South America Colombia
Southern Africa So. African Customs Union
Southern Asia India
Southern Europe Croatia
Southern Europe Greece
Southern Europe Italy
Southern Europe Malta
Southern Europe Portugal
Southern Europe Slovenia
Southern Europe Spain
Western Asia Cyprus
Western Asia Israel
Western Asia Saudi Arabia
Western Asia Turkey
Western Europe Austria
Western Europe Belgium-Luxembourg
Western Europe France
Western Europe Germany
Western Europe Netherlands
Western Europe Switzerland
Table 1: Countries included in the analysis.
2.2. Stage Specialization
Vertical Specialization (VS) is defined as the phenomenon of disintegration of production,
with each country specializing in particular stages of a good’s production sequence. A
common measure of vertical specialization is the one defined in Hummels, Ishii, and Yi
(2001), and expanded in Johnson and Noguera (2012), which is the value of imported goods
used as inputs to produce a country’s export goods, i.e. the foreign value added embodied
in exports. This measure emphasizes the multiple border crossing in the production of a
good. For country i and sector k, vertical specialization (VS) is defined as
V Sik ≡
imported intermediatesik
gross outputik
exportsik,
and for country i is defined as
V Si =
∑
k V Sik∑
k exportsik
.
The data used in this paper comes from the Inter-Country Input-Output tables produced by
the OECD (OECD, 2008). Table 2.2 shows the countries for which information is available,
and the region they belong to.
Figure 5 plots the relationship between vertical specialization and nominal GDP in 2008,
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Figure 5: Relationship between vertical specialization and GDP, 2008
and table 2 shows the results of running a linear regression between vertical specialization
and the logarithmic of GDP, for the same year. As can be seen, an increase in GDP of
one percent is associated with a decrease in vertical specialization of 3.5 percentage points.
That means that wealthier countries use relatively more domestic inputs to produce their
exports.
The vertical specialization measure is a common way to described the specialization in
stages, and integration in production of countries. However, this paper also uses the ratio
final goods exported overt total goods exported, and figure 6 shows the relationship between
this ratio and the logarithmic of GDP, while table 3 shows the result of running a linear
regression between the two variables. The pattern of stage specialization persists in this
additional measure, and an increase in GDP of 1% is associated with a decrease in the ratio
of final goods exported of 1 percentage point.
Finally, and as a way to emphasize the importance of vertical specialization in trade, figure
7 shows the contribution of vertical specialization to the growth of exports to GDP ratio.
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Dependent variable:
Vertical Specialization
log(GDP) −3.511∗∗∗
(0.755)
Constant 129.625∗∗∗
(19.994)
Observations 58
R2 0.279
Adjusted R2 0.266
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2: Linear regression of Vertical Specialization and GDP
Figure 6: Relationship between Ratio of Final Exported and GDP, 2008
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Dependent variable:
Ratio of Final Goods Exported
log(GDP) −1.055∗∗
(0.494)
Constant 85.932∗∗∗
(13.056)
Observations 60
R2 0.073
Adjusted R2 0.057
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3: Linear Regression of Ratio of Final Goods Exported and GDP
Exports to GDP ratio is decomposed according to the following expression
∆
exportsk
outputk
= ∆
V Sk
outputk
+ ∆
exportsk − V Sk
outputk
.
Vertical Specialization accounts for 84% of the growth of manufacturing exports between
1995 and 2008, with percentages ranging from 33% to 102%. Moreover, in the same period,
vertical specialization accounts for 59%-102% of trade growth in European regions, and for
74% in Eastern Asian countries (China, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and Japan). These numbers
provide evidence that vertical links are relevant in explaining trade growth, and that a
model with stages could be more appropriate.
2.3. Model
The model used for the analysis is the two-stages version of Eaton and Kortum (2002),
outlined in Chapter 1. There are a continuum of varieties indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. Each
variety requires two stages of production: upstream (k = 1) and downstream (k = 2). The
model determines the share of varieties traded at each stage of production.
The household maximization problem is defined in section 1.2.1, and the production tech-
nology is defined in section 1.2.2.
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Figure 7: Contribution of vertical specialization to ratio of exports to GDP between 1995
and 2008
An equilibrium is a sequence of varieties, factor prices, and quantities, such that the first-
order conditions to the households’ maximization problem in equation (1.1) and firms’
maximization problem, associated with technologies (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4), as well as the
market clearing conditions (1.5), (1.6), (1.7), and (1.8) are satisfied.
2.3.1. Share of Upstream Varieties Traded
As shown in section 1.3, country i is the lowest cost source of upstream varieties for j with
probability
π1,ji = Pr
[
c1,ji ≤ min
s
{c1,js(z)}
]
,
=
T1,i (d1,jic1,i)
−n1∑I
s=1 T1,s (d1,jsc1,s)
−n1 ,
where c1,ji is the unit cost that i can deliver to j, d1,ji is the iceberg transport cost, and
c1,i is the upstream input cost produced in i, composed of wages and the price of Mi. The
expression T1,i (d1,jic1,i)
−n1 represents the technology available in j from i, discounted by
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input costs and geographic barriers. Since there is a continuum of varieties π1,ji is also the
fraction of upstream varieties that country j buys from i.
The price index for the composite intermediate defined in equation 1.4 is
Pj = Φ
− 1
n1
1,j exp(γ/n1) (2.1)
where Φ1,j =
∑I
s=1 T1,s (d1,jsc1,s)
−n1 and γ is the Euler’s constant.
2.3.2. Share of Downstream Varieties Traded
Cost minimization for the firm associated with technology 1.3, implies that the unit cost of
a downstream variety z, if produced in country i and delivered to country j ,with iceberg
transport cost d2,ij , is given by
c2,ji(z) =
ψ2d2,jiw
1−θ2
i c
θ2
1,i
A2,i(z)
, (2.2)
and its’ distribution is
Pr [C2,ji ≤ c2] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
A2,i(z) ≥
ψ2d2,jiw
1−θ2
i c
θ2
1
c2
∣∣∣c1] dG1,i(c1),
= 1− Φ1,jn1
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−T2,i
(
ψ2d2,jiw
1−θ2
i c
θ2
1
)−n2
cn22 − Φ1,ic
n1
1
]
cn1−11 dc1.
(2.3)
The probability that country j imports the downstream variety z from country i is the
probability that
π2,ij(z) =
∫ ∞
0
Πs 6=i (1− Pr [C2,si ≤ c2]) dPr [C2,ji ≤ c2] , (2.4)
where Pr [C2,ji ≤ c2] is defined in (2.3). This equation will be computed numerically.
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2.3.3. Equilibrium
The empirical implementation is to production and trade in manufactures. Manufacturing
labor income in country i is labor’ share of country i’s manufacturing production. Thus
wiLi = (1− θ1)
I∑
j=1
π1,jiX1,j + (1− θ2)π2,jiX2,j (2.5)
where Li is manufacturing workers, and X1,j and X2,j is total spending on upstream and
downstream varieties, respectively. Denote aggregate final expenditure as Yi with α the
fraction spent on manufactures. Total expenditure on downstream varieties is given by
X2,i = αYi, (2.6)
and total expenditure on upstream varieties by
X1,i = θ2
I∑
j=1
π2,ijX2,j + θ1
I∑
j=1
π1,ijX1,j . (2.7)
Final expenditure Yi consists of value-added in manufacture wiLi plus income generated in
nonmanufacturing Y0,i.
2.4. Estimation
2.4.1. Parameters
Trade costs of upstream varities are assumed to be equal to trade costs of downstream
varities, that is dji = d1,ji = d2,ji ∀i, j, and following Eaton and Kortum (2002), are
specified as
dji = exp(Γxji)MjUij , (2.8)
where xij is a vector of observables, that includes distance, dummy for contiguity, and
dummy for common language; Mj is an importer fixed effect, and Γ is a vector of coefficients
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on the bilateral variables xij . The error term consists of two components, one of them is a
country-pair specific component that affect two-way trade. Trade costs within the country
are assumed to be non-existent, i.e. djj = 1.
Additionally, the technology parameter of the upstream varieties is assumed to be the same
as the technology parameter of the downstream variety. That is, Ti = T1,i = T2,i. Since
there is a continuum of varieties, the probability that country i is the lowest cost source of
an upstream variety for country j, which is given in equation (1.14), is also the fraction of
upstream varieties that country j buys from country i. That is,
π1,ij =
X1,ji
X1,j
=
Ti
(
djiψ1(wi)
1−θ1(Pi)
θ1
)−n1
Φ1,j
, (2.9)
where Xk,j is country j’s total spending on stage k, of which Xk,ji is spent on varieties from
i. Dividing this expression by the analogous expression for the share of upstream varieties
that country j buys from itself, and applying logarithms, gives
X1,ji/X1,j
X1,jj/X1,j
=
Ti
(
djiψ1(wi)
1−θ1(Pi)
θ1
)−n1
Φ1,j
Φ1,j
Tj (djjψ1(wj)1−θ1(Pj)θ1)
−n1
X1,ji
X1,jj
=
Ti
Tj
(
wi
wj
)−n1(1−θ1)(Pi
Pj
)−n1θ1
d−n1ji ,
log
(
X1,ji
X1,jj
)
= log
(
Ti
Tj
)
− n1(1− θ1) log
(
wi
wj
)
− n1θ1 log
(
Pi
Pj
)
− n1 log(dji),
log
(
X1,ji
X1,jj
)
= log
(
Ti
Tj
)
− n1(1− θ1) log
(
wi
wj
)
− n1θ1 log
(
Pi
Pj
)
− n1Γxji − n1 log(Mj)− n1 log(Uij).
Rearranging the terms, the previous expression gets reduced to
log
(
X1,ji
X1,jj
)
= Si − (Sj + n1Mj)− n1Γxji + uji,
where Si = log(Ti)− n1(1− θ1) log(wi)− n1θ1 log(Pi). The previous equation is estimated
by generalized least squares. The share of imported intermediates over domestic interme-
diates (Xji1 /X
jj
1 ), is obtained from the OECD Input-Output database (OECD, 2008) and
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geographic characteristics (xji) are obtained from CEPII (Head, Mayer, and Ries, 2010)
1.
Parameters can be retrieved by estimating
Ŝi = log(Ti)− n1(1− θ1) log(wi)− n1θ1 log(Pi).
A country’s technology (Ti) is approximated with domestic R&D capital stocks, estimated
by Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) using the perpetual inventory method to add up
real R&D investment 2. Since wage costs (wi) are correlated with the level of technology,
total workforce and population density are used as instruments, in the following way
log(ulc× e−hc) = log(lf× e−hc) + log(lf/area),
where “ulc” are unit labor costs in nominal terms obtained from the OECD databases
(OECD, 2019); “hc” is an index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling
and returns to education, obtained from Penn World Database (Feenstra et al., 2015); “lf”
is the labor force obtained from the World Bank database (Bank, 2008), and the area of the
country is obtained from the CEPII Gravity Database (OECD, 2019). The price level (Pi),
is also correlated with the level of technology, so is instrumented using area, population,
and technology level of the country. The dependent variables GDP price index, and the
population were obtained from the Penn World Database (Feenstra et al., 2015).
The share of intermediate varieties used to produce the final goods (θ2), can be retrieved
from the data, and is equal to
θ̂2 =
1
I
I∑
j=1
(∑I
i=1X1,ji∑I
i=1X2,ij
)
.
Up to the previous step, the only parameter left to calibrate is the heterogeneity of the
1Formulation includes distance, dummy for contiguity, and dummy for common language
2Only available for 24 of the 60 countries
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Parameters Definition Value Source
n1 Comparative advantage stage 1 5.65 Section 2.4.1
n2 Comparative advantage stage 2 5.08 Section 2.4.1
θ1 Intermediates share stage 1 0.75 Section 2.4.1
θ2 Intermediates share stage 2 0.68 Section 2.4.1
α Manufacturing share 0.17 Input-Output database
Ti States of technology Table 5 Section 2.4.1
dji Geographic barriers Table 6 Section 2.4.1
Table 4: Summary of Parameters
second stage, given by n2. Equation (2.3), with calibrated parameters looks like
Pr [C2,ji ≤ c2] = 1− Φ̂1,jn̂1
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−T̂i
(
ψ̂2d̂jiŵi
1−θ̂2cθ̂21
)−n2
cn22 − Φ̂1,ic
n̂1
1
]
cn̂1−11 dc1,
and this expression can be plugged into equation (2.4). The parameter n2 is estimated
in order to minimize the difference between the actual and estimated share of imported
downstream varieties defined in (2.4).
Table 4 shows the calibrated and estimated parameters, that will be used in the following
sections.
2.4.2. Fitness of the model
For the model described in this paper, vertical specialization can be summarized by
V Si = (1− π1,ii) [θ2XRi + θ1(1−XRi)]
where XRi =
∑
j 6=iX2,ij∑
j 6=iX1,ij+X2,ij
, is the ratio of downstream varieties exported, over total
manufacturing exports. The correlation between actual and estimated vertical specialization
is 81%, and is plotted in figure 8.
The correlation between actual and estimated ratio of downstream varieties exported is 46%
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Country Value
Argentina 117.68
Australia 391.67
Austria 317.88
Belgium 401.35
Bulgaria 2.69
Brazil 1146.04
Brunei Darussalam 44.75
Canada 637.84
Switzerland 486.05
Chile 1003.29
China 2012.26
Colombia 38.20
Costa Rica 6.11
Cyprus 5.88
Czech Republic 35.66
Germany 1467.56
Denmark 276.96
Spain 394.69
Estonia 3.84
Finland 305.10
Country Value
France 1130.99
United Kingdom 1115.60
Greece 90.83
Hong Kong 120.79
Croatia 0.41
Hungary 19.89
Indonesia 32.18
India 43.01
Ireland 153.98
Iceland 41.46
Israel 351.68
Italy 671.06
Japan 2099.64
Cambodia 0.23
Korea (Republic of) 729.27
Lithuania 1.83
Latvia 2.53
Mexico 130.14
Malta 0.95
Malaysia 191.46
Country Value
Netherlands 485.91
Norway 243.53
New Zealand 95.33
Philippines 8.51
Poland 27.24
Portugal 99.70
Romania 8.84
Russian Federation 3356.63
Saudi Arabia 4941.69
Singapore 716.43
Slovakia 9.95
Slovenia 2.02
Sweden 536.64
Thailand 148.94
Tunisia 3.59
Turkey 46.36
Taiwan, Province of China 530.13
United States of America 3675.72
Viet Nam 11.84
South Africa 193.79
Table 5: States of Technology
Source of Barrier Value
log(distance) -1.00
Contiguity 0.34
Common language 0.21
Destination country:
Argentina 0.60
Australia 0.43
Austria 0.66
Belgium 0.53
Bulgaria 0.84
Brazil 0.48
Brunei Darussalam 0.84
Canada 0.46
Switzerland 0.61
Chile 0.50
China 0.37
Colombia 0.69
Costa Rica 0.82
Cyprus 0.96
Czech Republic 0.66
Germany 0.42
Denmark 0.61
Spain 0.49
Estonia 0.99
Finland 0.60
Source of Barrier Value
France 0.50
United Kingdom 0.45
Greece 0.69
Hong Kong 0.63
Croatia 1.21
Hungary 0.69
Indonesia 0.53
India 0.49
Ireland 0.52
Iceland 0.98
Israel 0.63
Italy 0.49
Japan 0.40
Cambodia 0.90
Korea (Republic of) 0.38
Lithuania 1.08
Latvia 1.03
Mexico 0.51
Malta 0.94
Malaysia 0.46
Source of Barrier Value
Netherlands 0.61
Norway 0.57
New Zealand 0.59
Philippines 0.63
Poland 0.65
Portugal 0.68
Romania 0.83
Russian Federation 0.44
Saudi Arabia 0.45
Singapore 0.45
Slovakia 0.76
Slovenia 0.89
Sweden 0.53
Thailand 0.46
Tunisia 0.88
Turkey 0.65
Taiwan, Province of China 0.43
United States of America 0.33
Viet Nam 0.57
South Africa 0.53
Table 6: Geographic Barriers
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Figure 8: Correlation between actual an estimated vertical specialization.
and is plotted in figure 9.
Finally, figure 10 shows the relationship between actual and estimated exports to GDP ratio.
In this case the correlation is weaker, of only 23%, and the model tends overestimates the
ratio.
2.5. Patterns of Vertical Specialization
Figure 5 in section 2.2, showed that countries with higher income tend to have lower levels
of vertical specialization. This pattern of vertical specialization along with the relation be-
tween the ratio of downstream varieties exported and GDP plotted in figure 6, suggests that
technologically advanced countries -and therefore, countries with higher income- produce
relatively more inputs than final goods. This pattern of specialization will be important in
the explaining the impact of reducing trade barriers over income distribution, in a world of
multi-stage production. Therefore, this section explores this pattern of vertical specializa-
tion in a two stages model.
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Figure 9: Correlation between actual an estimated ratio of downstream varieties exported.
Figure 10: Correlation between actual an estimated exports to GDP ratio
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Figure 11: Relationship between vertical specialization and income.
Figure 11 compares vertical specialization of two initially identical countries, when country
A experiments an increase in its technology, while country B stays the same. To simplify
the exposition, and only for this section, the heterogeneity parameter and the share of
intermediate goods of the second stage are assumed to be equal to the parameters of the
first stage (i.e. n1 = n2 = 5.09, and θ1 = θ2 = 0.75). As represented by the solid lines in
figure 11, when there are no trade frictions, and both countries have the same technology
(i.e. the ratio of technology is 1), both countries have the same vertical specialization ratio.
When country A experiments an increase in technology, its vertical specialization decreases,
which means it is using relatively more domestic inputs for the production of its exports.
This pattern of specialization occurs even when there are no trade costs, nor differences in
the production process. This suggests that this pattern of vertical specialization is a result
of the marginal value of saving costs at the input level being larger than the marginal value
of saving costs at the final goods level.
The dashed lines in the same figure, compares vertical specialization of the same two coun-
tries, when country A experiments an increase in its technology, but this time, there are
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Figure 12: Relationship between ratio of downstream varieties exported over total exports,
and ratio of technology.
trade frictions. It can be seen that pattern of vertical specialization persists, but the levels
are lower.
It can be argued that vertical specialization it is heavily influenced by the share of upstream
inputs shared between the countries, and that like in any gravity equation, trade is positively
correlated with the income level of the partner country. In order to eliminate doubts on the
mechanism, the ratio of downstream varieties exported over total exports (defined as XRi
in the previous section), is analyzed. Figure 12, follows the same exercise as figure 11, and
compares XR for different technology ratios between two initially identical countries. When
country A’s technology increases relatively to country B’s, country B exports relatively more
downstream varieties while country A specializes in upstream varieties. When trade frictions
are introduced, this pattern of specialization becomes even more accentuated.
33
2.6. Zero-Gravity World
In this section the impact of eliminating trade barriers (i.e. setting dji = 0 for all j and
i) on welfare, and inequality is analyzed. This exercise is similar to the one performed in
Eaton and Kortum (2002), and the results will be compared in order to prove consistency.
Additionally, the impact on welfare and inequality in a two-stages model will be compared
to the impact in a one-stage model, in order to understand the implications of a multistage
production process over welfare and its distribution.
Welfare is measured as real GDP Wi = Yi/P
α
2,i, and inequality is described using Gini Index.
The Gini coefficient measures the inequality among values of a frequency distribution, and
is given by
G =
∑I
i=1
∑I
j=1 |Wi −Wj |
2I
∑I
i=1Wi
where Wi is the welfare an average person in country i. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses
perfect equality, where all values are the same (for example, where everyone has the same
welfare). A Gini coefficient of 100% expresses maximal inequality among values (e.g., for a
large number of people, where only one person has all the income or consumption, and all
others have none, the Gini coefficient will be very nearly one).
For simplicity, tariff revenues that geographic barriers might generate are ignored.
The impact on welfare of eliminating trade barriers depends on the assumptions over labor
mobility. If labor is assumed to be mobile between manufacturing and non-manufacturing,
the wage will be fixed and determined by the productivity in the non-manufacturing sector.
Moreover total nominal income is exogenous. When trade barriers are eliminated, prices
are equalized across nations, which particularly favors those countries with initially high
prices. Therefore, welfare increases for all countries and inequality decreases.
A more interesting case is the other extreme assumption that labor is immobile. In this
case, the number of manufacturing workers in each country is fixed, and non-manufacturing
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
∆ Wage 60 −21.987 15.437 −72.295 6.517
∆ Price 60 −300.670 27.819 −353.131 −248.797
∆ Welfare 60 29.459 18.510 −28.178 56.972
Table 7: Summary Statistics Changes in Welfare in Zero Gravity World - Immobile Labor
One Stage Model
income is exogenous. When labor is immobile there are two forces at work, the price
reduction described in the previous paragraph, and an impact on wages that will depend
on comparative advantages. In this exercise, manufacturing employment is set to its actual
level, and non manufacturing GDP to actual GDP less the baseline value for labor income
in manufacturing (actual employment times the baseline wage).
Table 7 shows the changes in wages, prices, and welfare in the one-stage model. This is a
similar exercise than the one made by Eaton and Kortum (2002), and the changes in welfare
follow the same trend, as shown in figure 13.
The first thing to notice is that in a one-stage model wages and welfare can either decrease
or increase. On the one hand, wages can decrease when the substitution effect dominates.
That is, the price of intermediates has gone down when trade barriers are eliminated, and
since labor and intermediates are substitutes in production, the price reduction pushes
wages down. On the other hand, the decrease in prices pushes the demand for final goods
up, which pushes the demand for intermediates up. This increase in demand, pushes wages
(and prices) up.
Table 8 shows the changes in wages, prices, and welfare from eliminating trade barriers,
but when the production process has two tradable stages. Labor is also assumed to be
immobile, and results are compared with the one-stage case described in table 7. Notice
that in the two-stages model, welfare changes are larger than in the one-stage model. The
reason is that in the two-stages model, wages always go up, and the income effect that
pushes demand up dominates over the substitution effect. In the multistage, there is more
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Figure 13: Comparison of changes in welfare when moving to Zero Gravity in Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and this paper
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
∆ Wage 60 41.084 9.754 11.393 60.601
∆ Price 60 −177.446 7.992 −200.294 −161.767
∆ Welfare 60 71.446 9.491 41.131 90.522
Table 8: Summary Statistics Changes in Welfare in Zero Gravity World - Immobile Labor
Multistage Model
demand for varieties.
Figure 14 compares the changes in welfare with welfare in the base scenario -with trade
barriers- in the one-stage model. As can be seen in the figure, there is a decreasing relation
between the two variables, meaning that low income countries are the ones that experiment
larger increases in welfare, driven by lower reductions in wages. As a result, in the new
equilibrium inequality goes down, from 82.2 to 78.6
The comparison between changes in welfare and welfare in the base scenario is shown in
figure 15. In this case, the relation follows an inverted u-shape, and the larger increases in
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Figure 14: Relationship between changes in wages and wages in base scenario - one stage
model
welfare favor middle-high income countries. As a result, overall inequality increases from
74.8 to 75.1.
To better understand the impact on welfare distribution, figure 16 compares the relation-
ship between income and the ratio of downstream varieties over total exports, for the base
scenario estimated in section 2.4, and for the zero gravity case, with a two-stages produc-
tion process. When trade barriers are eliminated (red dots), all countries tend to receive
relatively more income from the production of inputs rather than from final goods. Since
high-income countries tend to have a comparative advantage on upstream varieties, will be
more favored by this policy.
For completion, figure 17 compares the levels of vertical specialization before and after the
trade liberalization. In the zero gravity case, all countries end up with relatively similar
levels of vertical specialization. This conclusion differs from the results of the two-country
case shown in figure 11, because in the multi-country case all countries are able find suppliers
with comparative advantages on inputs.
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Figure 15: Relationship between changes in wages and wages in base scenario.
Figure 16: Relationship between ratio of second stage goods exported and income.
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Figure 17: Relationship between vertical specialization and income.
2.7. Conclusion
This study develops a model to quantify the welfare and income distribution effect of frag-
mentation. As a first note, the model shows that technologically advanced countries will
tend to specialize in earlier stages of production, even when productivity shocks of both
stages follow the same distribution. The reason is that the marginal value of savings costs
at the input level is larger than the marginal value of savings costs at the final goods level.
The main takeaway of this paper is the different impacts of reducing trade barriers in a
world with fragmented production. As expected, when production is fragmented, welfare
gains of eliminating trade barriers are larger. But, income distribution consequences are
different in a model with one stage versus a two stages model. In the first one, eliminating
trade barriers reduces inequality, while in the later one, inequality rises.
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CHAPTER 3 : INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
3.1. Introduction
Recent literature emphasizes the importance of technological progress in explaining pro-
ductivity differences across firms and countries. One source of technological progress comes
from creating new products or processes; another source of technological progress is adaption
of technologies developed elsewhere. This last strategy is considered easier to implement
and, therefore, a source of high growth at a relatively low cost. However, many developing
countries fail to use technologies that would significantly increase their productivity and
the reasons for this failure are not clear. One plausible explanation is that firms in develop-
ing countries do not have the required absorptive capacity to recognize the value of a new
technology, assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends Cohen and Levinthal (1990).
The importance of absorptive capacity in adopting frontier technologies is illustrated in
the research done by Bloom et al. (2011) in India. They introduced modern management
practices in a sample of firms in India, and evaluated the results. Bloom et al. (2011) found
that the implementation of these practices significantly increased the productivity of these
firms, and therefore wondered why these practices were not implemented earlier. They
conclude that financial constraints are not the main reason for why modern management
techniques are not practiced, but that the lack of information about their existence, and
the lack of knowledge about how these practices, if applied, could be profitable are the real
issues.
Moreover, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) shows that low levels of absorptive capacity can
drive the “non-invented-here” syndrome, in which firms resist accepting innovative ideas
from the environment. If the ideas are too distant from the firm’s existing knowledge base,
the firm will not adopt them because it does not appreciate them or it can not access to
them.
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In this paper, I explore the relationship between human capital and the decision of whether
to innovate or to imitate technologies developed elsewhere, in order to increase productivity.
Innovation is usually considered a difficult strategy, that requires highly qualified personnel
to be successful. But human capital can also affect the absorptive capacity of a firm. For ex-
ample, high-skilled workers might be better informed about frontier technologies and about
how those technologies could be useful for their purposes, which is the first step for adopting
a new technology. Also, new technologies might simply require high-skilled workers to be
successfully implemented. Bloom et al. (2011) also conclude that new management prac-
tices are skilled-biased technologies, which implies that implementing them would require
increasing the number of skilled workers. If developing countries have a shortage of high-
skilled workers, it would more difficult for firms to adopt frontier technologies. In addition,
if the frontier technology is too advanced compared to the current technological level of the
firm, the cost of imitating it becomes even higher Hall and Khan (2003).
This paper starts from the puzzling fact that firms in developing countries are more likely
to follow an innovation strategy rather than an imitation strategy, even though frontier
technologies seem to be more productive, and firms would have more to gain from acquir-
ing them. I also present some facts that suggest that innovation strategies could be even
more frequent in developing countries than in advanced economies. The hypothesis behind
these facts is that, differences on human capital endowments between advanced and lag-
gard economies, makes the technologies developed in advanced countries not suitable or
less productive in the developing world, and therefore, the optimal decision for firms in
less developed countries, is to create their own technologies. A similar idea is presented
Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999), therefore I derive an extension of their model to rationalize
the described findings.
3.2. Related Literature
There exists abundant literature on both, technology diffusion, and innovation; but only
recently economists have attempted to study the decision of a firm to either innovate or
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imitate, rather than focusing on only one of those growth strategy. In addition, technology
diffusion in developing countries it is a major topic of research, but research on innovation
in these countries is more scarce.
On the technology diffusion side, Eaton and Kortum (1996), conclude that imitation ex-
plains most of the economic growth of all OECD countries, but the United States, that
instead it is leading the innovation process. Moreover, for all but the five leading research
economies (United Sates, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom) the 90% of the
growth rates is explained by imitation of technology. Eaton and Kortum (1996) conclude
that diffusion of technology results in all countries growing at the same rate, with countries
that can absorb more innovations having higher relative productivity. In particular, they
show that a country’s level of education significantly facilitates its ability to adopt technol-
ogy. Furthermore, Comin and Hobiijn (2006) conclude that adoption lags - defined as the
length of time between the invention and adoption of a technology- accounts for at least a
quarter of per capita income disparities in their sample of countries.
Also related to technology diffusion, Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999) find that, even when
there are no barriers to adoption of technologies, difference in productivity might never be
reduced. The explanation is that frontier technologies are skilled bias in response to a rela-
tively abundance of skilled workers, which makes them less productive when complemented
with unskilled workers. Since in developing countries skilled workers are scarce, frontier
technologies are less productive than in the country where they were produced, and lagged
economies will never reach the productivity levels of the frontier.
A subset of the technology diffusion literature focuses on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
FDI has long been considered an important channel for technology diffusion and there are
several models that show how multinational enterprises might generate learning external-
ities for domestic firms, through labor training or through the provision of high-quality
intermediate inputs. However the evidence on FDI spillovers it is not conclusive Keller
(2004). Most studies find no effect and even negative effect of FDI in the productivity
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of the host country. Studies that find positive effect of FDI use data from the United
States and the United Kingdom, which implies that the results do not necessarily apply
to developing countries. According to Xu (2000), rich countries benefit from hosting U.S.
multinational subsidiaries while poorer countries do not as much, because some threshold
level of human capital is needed to successfully adopt foreign technology.
Finally, recent literature has looked into the endogenous decision between imitation and
innovation, and how this affects economic growth (Jovanovic and MacDonald (1993), Ace-
moglu et al. (2006), Benhabib et al. (2014), König et al. (2012), Luttmer (2012)). Usually
in these models, it is assumed that laggard economies are more intensive in imitation ac-
tivities, while advanced economies are focused in innovation. In Acemoglu et al. (2006),
the benefit of developing economies of following an imitation strategy is large, but rigid
arrangements are assumed at early stages of development, resulting in economies switching
out of the imitation strategy too son or too late. In Jovanovic and MacDonald (1993),
both innovation and imitation are costly activities. The cost of imitation is represented in
the form of informational barriers, that depend on the firm’s current know-how and the
know-how of other firms. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1993) use their model to explain firm
size variances. In Benhabib et al. (2014) the productivity of the imitation strategy depends
on investments that facilitate technology diffusion and on how easily is to adopt existing
superior technologies. The ease of adopting technologies is measured by the distance to fron-
tier. Benhabib et al. (2014) develop a model in which the initial productivity distribution
affects the balanced growth path at which an economy converges, and were the efficiency
of technology diffusion determines whether agents will ultimately catch up to the frontier,
fall-back and continue to grow through technology diffusion or conduct autarkic innova-
tion. In König et al. (2012)’s model, it is also assumed that there is a relative advantage of
imitation over innovation for laggard firms, but the model can also generate ”convergence
clubs” when including limited capacity to absorb knowledge through imitation. Luttmer
(2012) develop a model of noisy innovation and imitation that generates a balanced growth
path along which, aggregate productivity grows faster than the average rate at which indi-
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vidual producers are able to innovate. In Luttmer (2012)’s model there is and indirected
search process, that delays the productivity of imitation, and gives rise to a thick tailed
distribution of firm size.
Li (2011) studies innovation and imitation in the context of a developing country, more
specifically on high-tech Chinese industries. The author studies the effect of technology
diffusion on in-house R&D of firms, and concludes that technology imports alone do not
contribute to the rate of patenting and that absorptive capacity is crucial for assimilating
foreign technology. On the other hand, Li (2011) founds that absorptive capacity is not
required for taking advantage of domestic knowledge (i.e. technology diffusion within the
country) and that its presence facilitates firm’s innovation. Li (2011) suggests that the
argument for absorptive capacity is contingent upon the source of knowledge.
3.3. Expansion Strategies and Human Capital in Latin American Countries
In this section I present three facts. First, for a selected group of Latin American countries,
the innovation strategy is more frequent than the imitation strategy, that is, there are more
firms spending resources on creating technologies than firms bringing technologies from
the frontier. Second, firms that imitate technology tend to have higher levels of human
capital than firms innovating. Lastly, foreign technologies seem to have a higher impact on
increasing productivity.
Using data collected by The World Bank (2010) - described in the appendix-, I propose a
mechanism to distinguish firms that adopt technology from firms that create technology. I
also distinguish innovations that are locally novel from the ones that represent an innovation
at the frontier. Then, I compare several human capital indicators among firms that follow
different expansion strategies.
Consider the following expansion strategies:
1. Imitation Strategy. Firms are classified as frontier adopters or imitators if they
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answered “yes” to the following question: Does this establishment at present use tech-
nology licensed from a foreign-owned company, excluding office software?
2. Local Innovation. Firms are classified as innovators, but only locally, if they an-
swered “yes” to the following question: Does this establishment have any patents
registered in (insert name of country)?
3. Frontier Innovation. Firms are classified as frontier innovators if they answered
“yes” to the following question: Does this establishment have any patents registered
abroad?
These measures do not fully take into account all the firms following each strategy, because
they exclude firms that adopt some non-licensed technology or firms that create technology
but do not patent it. Patent information does not include all important technological
innovations nor reflect the importance of different innovations Li (2011). However, the fact
that the technology is protected by some intellectual property instrument assures that the
innovation is novel, at least to the country, and that has a positive value. Moreover, the
procedures to fill patents are homogeneous across industries, a feature that other innovation
measures like new product sales, do not fulfill Li (2011).
3.3.1. Frequency of Innovation and of Imitation
The following figure classifies Latin-American firms according to their expansion strategies.
More detailed statistics can be found in table 17 of the Appendix.
According to the diagram, only half of the firms have followed an expansion strategy; and,
among the firms that have followed an expansion strategy, most of them are local innovators.
This result is puzzling: in developing countries, we should expect a higher proportion of
firms following an imitation strategy rather than an innovation one. However, the data
suggests that firms prefer to create technologies that are locally novel rather than adopting
a probably more advanced technology developed elsewhere.
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Figure 18: Proportions of firms by Expansion Strategies
3.3.2. Human Capital of Innovators and Imitators
The hypothesis of this paper is that this preference for local innovations can be explained
by a lack of human capital endowment in the country or, in another words, a mismatch
of skill endowments with respect to the frontier countries. When human capital is low,
understanding and adopting frontier technologies could be more difficult than creating a
technology that, even though is not as advanced as the one already developed somewhere
else, represents an upgrade to their current level.
To support this hypothesis, the following table provides the estimated coefficients of three
regressions. In the first regression, the dependent variable is the percentage of the workforce
that has a bachelor degree. After controlling for foreign ownership, country of residence,
and the industry on which the firm is classified, the table shows that the proportion of
workers with a bachelor degree, in firms that follow a local innovation strategy, is only 1.46
percentage points higher than the proportion of workers with a bachelor degree in firms
not following any expansion strategy. On the other hand, the proportion of workers with
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Independent Variables Proportion of workforce Probability Training Log Wages
with Bachelor Degree
Only Local Innovation 1.46** (0.56) 1.45**(0.11) 0.34** (0.07)
Imitation 4.94** (0.71) 3.17** (0.35) 0.76** (0.08)
Frontier Innovation 5.99** (0.81) 3.60** (0.48) 1.02** (0.09)
Foreign Ownership Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
% Bachelor No No Yes
% Secondary No No Yes
R2 0.19 0.12 0.26
Observations 4,836 4,898 3,255
Table 9: Correlation between expansion strategies and human capital indicators
* means statistical significance at 90% level, and ** means statistical significance at 95% level.
a bachelor degree is almost five percentage points higher in firms following an imitation
strategy and almost six percentage points higher in firms following a frontier innovation
strategy. This result is consistent with the idea that the technology adopted from the
frontier requires a higher level of human capital than the technology developed locally.
The third column of the table shows the results of running a logistic regression on whether
a firm provides or not training for its workers. Using the same control variables as in the
previous regression, the table shows that the odds of a local innovator providing training
are 45% higher than of a firm that does not follow any innovation strategy. However, the
odds of a firm that imitates foreign technology to provide training are 217% higher, and
260% higher for a frontier innovator.
Finally, the fourth column shows the results of running an OLS regression on the logarithmic
of the average wage, controlling for foreign ownership, country of residence, industry, the
proportion of the workforce that has a bachelor degree, and the proportion of the workforce
that has a secondary degree. Local innovators pay an average wage 34% higher than firms
that do not follow any expansion strategy, while imitators pay an average wage 76% higher,
and frontier innovators pay an average wage 102% higher. Higher wages are associated with
higher productivity, and therefore are also associated with non-observable human capital
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variables.
From the results of the table, it can be concluded that imitators have higher levels of human
capital than local innovators, but lower levels of human capital than frontier innovators.
This conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis that frontier technologies require human
capital capabilities that are not abundant in developing countries.
3.3.3. Impact on Productivity of Innovation and Imitation
In this subsection I compare the impact on productivity of local technologies versus frontier
technologies. In order to do that, I estimate a total factor productivity (TFP) per firm, and
compare TFP’s distribution between 2006 and 2010 for three different groups: (1) firms
that responded not having any expansion strategy in 2010, (2) firms that have only local
innovations, and (3) firms that have acquired foreign technology 1. For this part, I only use
the panel version of the survey, i.e. only the firms that were surveyed in both, 2006 and
2010.
TFP per firm is estimated following König et al. (2012), that is, assuming a Cobb-Douglas
technology of the form
Yit = AitK
a
itL
b
itM
c
it,
where Yit denotes total sales of firm i at time t, Ait is total factor productivity, Kit its
physical capital, and Mit its costs of materials.
The following figure compares the distribution of TFP among the three groups over time,
and table 10 presents a T-test statistic for the difference on average productivity and a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. From the figure and the tests, it can be concluded that firms
that have followed only a local innovation strategy, did not have any increase in productivity
between 2006 and 2010. On the other hand, for imitators, it can be concluded with 95%
1There are not not enough observations for frontier innovators to make the analysis
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Figure 19: Productivity Distribution of Firms by Expansion Strategy No Growth Strategy
Group Obs.
T-Test Average Productivity Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
Difference Mean
Std. Err. Pr(diff<0)
Largest Difference
P-value
(A2006 −A2010) (A2006 −A2010)
No Growth Strategy 857 -0.02 0.06 0.38 -0.042 0.48
Local Innovation 569 -0.05 0.07 0.25 -0.049 0.51
Imitation 284 -0.18 0.11 0.05 -0.13 0.09
Table 10: Productivity Differences by year
confidence, that the average productivity in 2010 is higher than in 2006, and with 90%
confidence that the distribution for 2010 switched to the right when compared with the
distribution in 2006. These observations suggest that foreign technology has a larger impact
on productivity relatively to local innovations, and rise the question of why is not imitation
a more frequent strategy among firms.
3.4. Expansion Strategies and Human Capital: Worldwide Comparison
The previous analysis concluded that, in Latin American firms, the innovation strategy is
more frequent than the imitation strategy, and that firms with large levels of human capital
are the ones adopting foreign technologies, while firms with low levels of human capital
are “creating” technologies. In this section, I would like to compare expansion strategies
between developing countries and advanced economies and derive a similar set of facts,
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Figure 20: Productivity Distribution of Firms by Expansion Strategy Local Innovation
Figure 21: Productivity Distribution of Firms by Expansion Strategy Imitation
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using the WIPO Statistics Database. The description of the variables used in the analysis
can be found in section A.4, in the Appendix.
3.4.1. Frequency of Innovation and Imitation
First, I compare the proportion of patents that were developed and registered in the coun-
try relatively to the total number of inventions patented in the country2. The following
table shows the results of running a random effects regression on the proportion of patents
developed in the country, controlling for human capital and for the total number of patents
registered in the country. Human capital is measured using the human capital index con-
structed by Feenstra et al. (2013), that combines average years of schooling and assumed
rates of return. The table indicates that the fraction of domestic patents is a convex func-
tion of the level of human capital. That is, for less educated countries, the fraction of
domestic innovations decreases with the level of human capital, but for educated countries,
the fraction of domestic innovations increases with human capital. This observation is in
line with the one found in the previous section, that is, countries with low levels of human
capital have a higher propensity to innovate, when compared with countries with interme-
diate levels of human capital. However, once the country it is at the top of the educational
distribution, it becomes an innovator.
3.4.2. Productivity, Innovation, and Imitation
In the analysis, it has been assumed that, in developing countries, local innovations have
lower quality than the technologies developed abroad. To support this assumption, the
following table summarizes the results of running a regression on Total Factor Productivity
3 over the fraction of domestic patents, controlling for human capital and the total number
of patents registered in the country. The table shows that a higher fraction of patents
created in the country, is correlated with lower levels of TFP . However, when interacted
with human capital, the relationship becomes positive. This results supports the hypothesis
2Including patents developed abroad and registered in the country
3Data obtained from Feenstra et al. (2013).
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Log (National Patents/Total Patents)
(log Human Capital) -12.99*** (3.465)
(log Human Capital)2 8.801*** (1.833)
(log Total Patents) -1.267*** (0.272)
(log Total Patents)2 0.0418** (0.0162)
Constant 8.211*** (1.923)
Observations 903
R-sq Overall 0.2121
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 11: Random Effects regression on the fraction of patents developed in the country
over total patents registered.
that the imitation strategy, that is, bringing technologies from abroad has a higher impact
on TFP.
3.4.3. Technology Diffusion and Human Capital Gaps
Finally, I follow Eaton and Kortum (1996)’s procedure in order to explore the relationship
between human capital gaps and technology diffusion among countries. In their model, the
number of patent applications from country i for protection in country n depends mainly on
tree factors: (1) the number of researchers in country i, (2) the fraction of patents developed
in country i that are applicable in country n, and (3) the probability that an inventor from
country i chooses to seek protection in country n. The number of patents granted in country
n that were developed in country i, Pnit can be specified as
log
Pnit
Lit
= ln α+ log εnit + βlog
Rit
Lit
+ ωlog
yit
ynt
+ unit. (3.1)
The factor εni is the marginal probability that an invention that occurred in country i
is applicable in country n, measuring international technology diffusion. Rit and Lit are,
respectively, the number of researchers and the total workforce in country i at period t. In
Eaton and Kortum (1996) the probability that an inventor chooses to patent depends also
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Log TFP
Log (National Patents/Total Patents) -0.266∗∗∗ (0.0545)
Log Human Capital 1.124∗∗∗ (0.216)
Log Human Capital × Log (National Patents/Total Patents) 0.232∗∗∗ (0.0501)
Log Total Patents 0.0922∗∗∗ (0.00774)
Constant -2.551∗∗∗ (0.214)
Observations 890
R-sq Overall 0.3076
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 12: Random Effects regression on Total Factor Productivity.
on how large the step is with respect to the current technology level. The step size of a
patent is approximated with the relative levels of productivity.
Also, based on Eaton and Kortum (1996) the technology diffusion is approximated as
log εnit = ε11{HKit > HKnt}log
(
HKit
HKnt
)
+ ε21{HKit ≤ HKnt}log
(
HKit
HKnt
)
+ ε3KMni + ε4KM
2
ni + ε5log IMnit.
The variable HK measures the level of human capital, and is used to test how the human
capital gap affects the availability of the home country to adopt the foreign technology. The
effect of the technological gap is separated in two groups: if the origin country has lower or
greater level of human capital. The reason is that, when the technology gap increases the
first variable also increases, but the second variable decreases.
The factor KM corresponds to the distance in kilometers from n to i, and KM2 is the
square of the distance, capturing geographical impediments to technology diffusion. Finally
IM is n’s imports from i relative to n’s GDP, which examines whether imported goods are
vehicle for the diffusion of technology.
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Log Pnit/Lit
1{HKit > HKnt}× Log Ratio Human Capital -1.539∗∗∗ (0.155)
1{HKit ≤ HKnt}× Log Ratio Human Capital 4.280∗∗∗ (0.176)
KMni -0.000290
∗∗∗ (0.0000210)
KM2ni 1.22e-08
∗∗∗ (1.29e-09)
Log Rit/Lit 0.504
∗∗∗ (0.00878)
Log yit/ynt 0.126
∗∗∗ (0.0194)
Log IMnit 0.0979
∗∗∗ (0.00261)
Constant -5.861∗∗∗ (0.157)
Observations 48,156
R-sq overall 0.3506
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 13: Random Effects regression on patent applications from foreigners.
The results of estimating equation (3.1) can be found in the following table. In the first
line, the estimator of the human capital gap when the origin country has a higher level
of human capital, is presented. As expected, the sign is negative. The intuition behind
this result is that, when a technology was created with and/or for a higher level of human
capital than the one available in the country where the technology is been protected, the
less likely is that it is going to be successfully implemented. Therefore, technology diffusion
between countries with large differences in terms of human capital, decreases.
In the second line, the effect of the human capital gap is presented when the country where
the patent was originated has a lower level of human capital than the country where the
invention is been patented. The positive sign is, once again, expected. The higher the level
of human capital level of the origin country, the closest it gets to the knowledge level of
the country where the technology is to be protected, and the more likely is for the new
technology to be useful for the receiver country.
54
3.5. Model
The purpose of this section is to present a model that captures the facts previously exhibited:
in developing countries, more firms are creating technologies rather than adopting foreign
and probably more advanced technologies; and imitators have higher levels of human capital
in comparison with innovators. In the next section, the model is calibrated in order to
understand the effect of this mechanism on TFP levels.
The model of this paper is borrowed from Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999). In their paper,
the authors argue that lack of intellectual property rights and other barriers to technology
transfer induce R&D firms to target their innovations toward the needs of the advanced
economies, which are inappropriate for less developed countries, mainly because those tech-
nologies were developed for a different composition of human capital. The focus on dif-
ferences in skill endowments makes this model very appropriate for my analysis, in which
human capital gaps will explain intensities on technology diffusion and on innovation.
However, Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999) assume that no technologies are invented in less
developed countries, and that they adopt all technologies available from the advanced
economies because the cost of doing so is small. I change this assumption and instead,
a cost of adopting the technologies is introduced. Since there is a mismatch of technological
needs, the less developed countries will not adopt all technologies available and instead will
generate innovations more suitable to their needs.
The first part of this section explains the main features of the model developed by Ace-
moglu and Zilbotti (1999). Next, I introduce new assumptions to the technical progress
mechanism, to rationalize the patterns of innovation observed in less developed countries.
In equilibrium, the number of firms adopting foreign technology will depend on the relative
cost of innovation versus imitation, and on the endowments of human capital with respect
to the frontier country.
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3.5.1. Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999) Model
Environment
Consider an economy consisting of two type of countries: an advanced one, which will be
called the North, and a technologically laggard, which will be called the South. In addition,
the North and the South differ in the abundance of skills. The North has HN skilled and
LN unskilled workers, while the South has HS skilled and LS unskilled workers, where
HN
LN
> H
S
LS
.
There is a representative consumer with constant relative risk aversion preferences:
∫ ∞
t
C(τ)1−σ − 1
1− σ
exp(−ρ(τ − t)) dτ,
where C(τ) is consumption at time τ and ρ is the discount rate.
The output aggregate comes out of a Cobb-Douglas function:
Y ≡ exp
[∫ 1
0
ln y(i) di
]
, (3.2)
where y(i) denotes output in sector i. The price of the consumption aggregate in each
period is normalized to 1.
Each final good y(i) can be produced with two technologies: one uses unskilled labor (l)
and a set of differentiated intermediate goods (“machines”), while the other uses skilled
labor (h) and a different set of machines. Formally,
y(i) =
[∫ NL
0
kL(i, ν)
1−β dν
]
[(1− i)l(i)]β +
[∫ NH
0
kH(i, ν)
1−β dν
]
[iZh(i)]β, (3.3)
where kz(i, ν) is the quantity of machines of variety ν used in sector i together with workers
of skill level z. The terms (1 − i) and Zi denote exogenous sector and technology specific
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productivity levels. This implies that the skilled technology is relatively more productive
in producing goods with higher indexes. The parameter Z ≥ 1 measures the relative
productivity of skilled workers. NL and NH are the number of machines that can be used
with unskilled and skilled workers, respectively.
Given wages for skilled and unskilled workers (wL, wH), rental prices of machines {χl(ν), χH(ν)}
and the price of their product p(i), the final good producer demands machines {kz(i, ν)}z∈{L,H}
and workers ((l(i), h(i)) every period in order to solve
Max
l(i),h(i),{kz(i,ν)}z∈{L,H}
p(i)y(i)−wLl(i)−wHh(i)−
∫ NL
0
χL(ν)kL(i, ν) dν−
∫ NH
0
χH(ν)kH(i, ν) dν.
(3.4)
This problem is fully characterized by the following interior set of first order conditions,
kl(i, ν) = [(1− β)p(i)((1− i)l(i))β/χL(ν)]1/β
kh(i, ν) = [(1− β)p(i)(iZh(i))β/χH(ν)]1/β
l(i) =
p(i)β
[∫ NL
0 kL(i, ν)
1−ν dν
]
(1− i)β
wL

1
1−β
h(i) =
p(i)β
[∫ NH
0 kH(i, ν)
1−ν dν
]
(iZ)β
wH

1
1−β
(3.5)
Each type of machine is produced by a monopolist who owns the patent for that variety.
Machines depreciate instantaneously and the marginal cost of production is equal to θ units
of the final good. A monopolist producing a machine for sector z will set the machine price
so as to maximize its profits,
πz(ν) = Max
χ(ν)
(χ(ν)− θ)
∫ 1
0
kz(i, ν) di, (3.6)
subject to the demand equations given in (3.5). The profit maximizing prices is χz(ν) =
θ/(1 − β) = χ. Without loss of generality, the price is normalized to θ ≡ δ
β
1−β (1 − β)2, so
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that χ = δ
β
1−β (1− β). The parameter δ differs across countries and captures cross-country
differences in the price of capital. In the North δ = 1 and, typically, δ ≥ 1 in the South.
The pattern of comparative advantage embedded in the production function (3.3) makes
skilled workers relatively more productive in high indexed goods. Therefore, there will exist
a threshold sector J ∈ [0, 1] which that only unskilled workers sill be used to produced
goods with i ≤ J and only skilled workers will be used to produce goods with i ≥ J . Then,
the production of good i can be written as:
y(i) =
 δ
−1p(i)
1−β
β NL(1− i)l(i) if 0 ≤ i ≤ J ;
δ−1p(i)
1−β
β NHiZh(i) if J < i ≤ 1.
(3.7)
Technical progress takes the form of increases over time in NL and NH . This is an expanding
variety model that allows technical change to be skill complementary. Also, the degree to
which new technologies are skill complementary is endogenous.
Equilibrium
Market clearing conditions for labor and the fact that, given the Cobb-Douglas structure
in (3.2), the expenditure on final goods is constant, the following conditions hold
p(i) = PL(1− i)−β and l(i) = LJ for any 0 ≤ i ≤ J ;
p(i) = PHi
−β and h(i) = H1−J for any J < i ≤ 1,
where PL = p(0) and PH = p(1) are price indexes to be determined. The J point corre-
sponds to the indifference point, where
PH
PL
=
(
J
1− J
)β
(3.8)
To find J the condition of constant expenditure on final goods is used, which implies that
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PHy(1) = PLy(0). Then,
J =
(
1 +
(
NH
NL
ZH
L
)1/2)−1
. (3.9)
Using the numeraire rule that exp[
∫ 1
0 ln p(i) di] = 1, the price indexes can be found:
PL = e
−β
(
1 +
(
NH
NL
ZH
L
)1/2)β
PH = e
−β
(
1 +
(
NH
NL
ZH
L
)−1/2)β
3.5.2. Technical Progress
At this point the model starts to differ from Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999). New technologies
are developed using final output. The R&D to invent a new variety of either type of machine
costs µ. Firms can also imitate technologies from abroad, but they have to incur in a cost
ε ≤ µ to introduce it to the country. It is assumed that this is not a payment to the inventors
of the machine, but a cost to understand and adapt the technology. A firm that invents or
brings a machine from outside obtains an indefinite patent or franchise to produce it.
I focus on one particular equilibrium, in which the North innovates in both types of technolo-
gies, and the South copies skilled-complementary technologies and innovates in unskilled-
complementary technologies. In this equilibrium, the varieties available in each country
differ. Formally, NNL ≤ NSL and NNH > NSH and the law of motions of varieties are given by
˙NNz =
XNz
µ
, ṄSL =
XSL
µ
, and ṄSH =
XSH
ε
,
where XCz denotes total output devote to improve the technology of group z ∈ {L,H} in
country C ∈ {N,S}.
59
Symmetry across machines implies that V cz (ν, t) = V
c
z (t) for all ν, in particular
V cz (t) =
∫ ∞
t
exp
[
−
∫ τ
t
r(ω) dω
]
πcz(τ) dτ
where r(τ) is the interest rate at date τ , and
πCL (τ) = (χ− θ)
∫ JC
0
kCL (i, τ) di = δ
β
1−β (1− β)β(PCL (τ))1/βLC
πCH(τ) = (χ− θ)
∫ 1
JC
kCH(i, τ) di = δ
β
1−β β(1− β)(PCH (τ))1/βZHC
are the flow profits.
Free entry implies V SL = µ and V
S
H = ε. In Balanced Growth Path(BGP), the interest rate
is constant, then
πSH
πSL
=
ε
µ
⇒
PSH
PSL
=
(
ε
µ
LS
ZHS
)β
. (3.10)
Just like in Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999), the intuition of this formula is that, when skilled
workers are more abundant, the market for skill-complementary machines is larger, and
so the relative price of skill-intensive goods has to be lower. The new term is ε/µ: when
the cost of bringing skill-intensive technologies is higher, there are less skill-complementary
machines, and so the relative price of skill-intensive goods has to be higher.
Combining equations (3.10), (3.8) and (3.9), the relative productivity of skilled and unskilled
workers along the BGP is found:
NSH
NSL
=
(µ
ε
)2 ZHS
LS
. (3.11)
In the North, the relative productivity depends only on the endowments
NNH
NSL
= ZH
N
LN
, but
in the South it also depends on relative cost of imitation versus innovation.
Proposition 2 There exists a stable BGP. Along this growth path, GDP, consumption, and
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varieties grow at a constant rate, that differs per country. More specifically, in the South
the growth rate is
gS =
1
σ
(
µ−1δ
β
1−β β(1− β)e−1
(
LS +
µ
ε
ZHS
)
− ρ
)
, (3.12)
and in the North the growth rate is
gN =
1
σ
(
µ−1β(1− β)e−1
(
LN + ZHN
)
− ρ
)
. (3.13)
Proof is equivalent to Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999). In addition it has to be true that
gN = gS for the BGP to be stable, which means that
δ =
(
LN + ZHN
LS + µεZH
S
) 1−β
β
. (3.14)
Finally, the ratio of expenditure imitation and innovation is derived from the fact that along
the BGP
ṄSH
NSH
=
ṄSL
NSL
:
XSH
XSL
=
(µ
ε
) ZHS
LS
.
The relative endowments of the South reduce the fraction of resources spent in imitation,
but the relative costs increases the fraction. Low levels of human capital in the South can
explain less expenditure in the skilled-complementary technology developed in the North,
despite the cost advantage.
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σ ρ z β
2 0.04 1.5 1/3
Table 14: Calibration Parameters
3.5.3. Productivity Differences between the North and the South
Following Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999), total output per firm, can be decomposed into
capital input, labor input and total factor productivity (TFP):
pC(i)yCL (i) =p(i) [(1− i)NL]β︸ ︷︷ ︸
aCL (i)
lC(i)β
(∫ NCL
0
kCL (i, ν) dν
)1−β
;
pC(i)yCH(i) =p(i)
c
[iNH ]
β︸ ︷︷ ︸
aCH(i)
[zhC(i)]β
(∫ NCH
0
kCH(i, ν) dν
)1−β
.
(3.15)
The parameter aCz (i) corresponds to the productivity of firm i using technology z in country
C. As shown on the left panel of figure 22, technology diffusion allows for a higher level of
TFP for two reasons: increases the number skilled-complementary machines, and induces a
larger number of firms to use the more productive and skilled-complementary technology.
However, as shown in the right panel of figure 22 differences in TFP between the North
and the South may still persist when the South has less human capital than the North,
for two reasons: less firms use the more productive technology, and there are less skilled-
complementary technologies available. There is a caveat to the analysis: there are more
unskilled-complementary technologies available in the South, so this effect can decrease the
TFP differences between the two countries.
3.6. Calibration
In this section I calibrate the model to simulate the economies of the selected Latin American
countries for the survey done by The World Bank (2010). First, the following parameters
are assumed.
62
Figure 22: Simulated TFP South TFP with and without Technology Diffusion
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Figure 23: Simulated TFP North and South TFP with Technology Diffusion
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The variable that I intend to replicate is the fraction of firms that are using unskilled-
complementary technologies, defined as J in the model. Given the assumptions of the
model, J also represents the fraction of firms using technologies developed locally, while
1 − J represents the proportion of firms using technologies developed abroad, i.e. the
proportion of imitators 4. The true J for every country in the South is assumed to be
the proportion of firms using local innovations over the total number of firms using some
type of expansion strategy. These statistics are shown in section 3.3 and correspond to the
database constructed by The World Bank (2010).
Equation (3.9) shows the formula to estimate J . The cost of innovation (µ) can be pinned
down using equation (3.13). The value for the growth rate in the North (gN ) is assumed
to be the average growth rate of the United States between 2001 and 2010, calculated
using Real GDP data from Feenstra et al. (2013). The skilled and unskilled population is
approximated using the proportion of the population that has some tertiary education in
2010 estimated by Barro and Lee (2013) and the total employment estimated by Feenstra
et al. (2013) of the same year. The cost of imitation (ε) is estimated in order to minimize
the difference between the true J and the estimated one. The ratio µ/ε is found to be
1.9316.
The following figure and table 15 compare the estimated results with the true value. The
model tends to underestimate the proportion of local innovators, but the patterns across
countries are similar. Moreover the correlation between the true and the estimated values,
is 0.5309.
The implication of these results is that, given the human capital available in the Latin
American countries, and the assumed model, it is optimal for the majority of the firms to
develop local innovations to try to increase their productivity.
To understand the impact of mismatch of abilities plus a cost of imitation ε ∈ (0, µ), I
4Recall that it is assumed that NSL ≥ NHL which means that unskilled-complementary technologies are
developed in the South, and NSH < N
N
H which means that skilled-complementary technologies are developed
in the North
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Figure 24: Technology diffusion without mismatch of skills
Countries Estimated J Actual J
Argentina 0.7328 0.5481
Bolivia 0.5682 0.5792
Chile 0.6622 0.6985
Colombia 0.5719 0.6199
Mexico 0.6339 0.5846
Panama 0.5491 0.6629
Paraguay 0.8018 0.8072
Peru 0.6339 0.6755
Uruguay 0.8069 0.7143
Venezuela 0.6966 0.7002
Table 15: Estimated and Actual proportion of firms using local innovations
66
Figure 25: Estimated and Actual TFP
estimate the impact of this mechanism on TFP. The estimated TFP using equation (3.15),
compared with the actual TFP in 2010 Feenstra et al. (2013) is presented in the following
figure.
The model overestimates the relative TFP of the countries, which is expected since the
model also predicts a higher bias towards skilled-complementary machines, as seen in table
15. This bias is also expected since the model does not take into consideration other
variables that might affect differences in TFP, like institutions or the development of the
financial market. However, the correlation between the two TFP measures is 0.2731, and
the model can account for a 45% of the differences in productivity between the selected
Latin American countries and United States.
3.7. Conclusion
Differences in TFP across countries have persisted over time, and technology has not diffused
as fast as expected to eliminate these differences. In this paper I show that, rather than
importing frontier technologies, most firms in developing countries, are creating technologies
that are at least locally novel. I also show that innovators tend to have less skilled workers
than imitators. These two observations are consistent with the existence of a skills mismatch
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between advanced economies and developing countries, which makes frontier technologies
less productive in the developing world.
I extend the model developed by Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999), incorporating innovation
from firms in less developed economies and costly imitation of frontier technologies, and
calibrate it to match the proportion of firms innovating in ten Latin American countries. The
correlation between the observed and estimated data is 55%, and the mechanism described
in this paper could account for 45% of the differences in TFP of the selected countries with
respect to the United States.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Derivation of the Share of Downstream Varieties bought at Home
The distribution of c1,j is given by equation (1.11). Using variable transformation it can be
shown that c−nθ21,H follows a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter β = n/θ2 and scale
parameter µ = Φ
1
β
1 .
Pr
[
C−nθ21,H = (c
′
H)
]
= −Pr
[
C1,H = (c
′
H)
− 1
nθ2
]
×− 1
nθ2
(c′H)
− 1
nθ2
−1
,
= Φ1
1
θ2
T
1
θ2
1 exp
(
−Φ1T
1
θ2
1 (c
′
H)
−1
θ2
)
(c′H)
−1
θ2
−1
.
Equivalently, it can be shown that 1/c−nθ21,F follows a Weibull distribution with shape pa-
rameter α = n/θ2 and scale parameter λ = Φ
− 1
α
1 .
Pr
[
Cnθ21,F = (c
′
F )
]
= Pr
[
C1,F = (c
′
F )
− 1
nθ2
]
× 1
nθ2
(c′F )
− 1
nθ2
−1
,
= Φ1
1
θ2
T
1
θ2
1 exp
[
−Φ1T
1
θ2
1 (c
′
F )
1
θ2
]
(c′F )
1
θ2
−1
.
As proved in Nadarajah (2005), the c.d.f. of the product of a Weibull Distribution and a
Fréchet distribution when α = β can be expressed as
F (ν) =
1
1 +A
,
for A =
(
µλ
ν
)β
. From this result follows that the c.d.f. of
(
c1,H
c1,F
)−nθ2
can be expressed as
F (ν) = Pr
[(
C1,H
C1,F
)−nθ2
≤ ν
]
,
=
1
1 + Φ1Φ1 (ν)
−1
θ2
,
=
(ν)
1
θ2
1 + (ν)
1
θ2
. (A.1)
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows from Theorem 1.14 in Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988): Let X be a
unimodal random variable. If max{X−m, 0} is stochastically larger than −min{X−m, 0},
then X has a mode M satisfying M ≤ m ≤ µ, where m is defined as the median of X, and
µ is the mean of X.
Define Z ≡ 11+νdn , and the c.d.f. of ν is defined in equation (A.1). By using variable
transformation, the c.d.f of Z can be found, and is equal to
Pr [Z ≤ z] =
∫
−Pr
[
ν = dn
(
1
z
− 1
)]
×−d
n
z2
dz,
=
1
1 + d
− n
θ2
(
1
z − 1
) 1
θ2
. (A.2)
Definition 1 X is unimodal about some point M = M [F ], called a mode of X, when F (x)
is convex for x ∈ (−∞,M) and concave for x ∈ (M,∞).
Proposition 3 The random variable Z is unimodal.
Proof : Redefine (A.1) as a function of the random variable 1ω , when n = n1 = n2:
G
(
1
ω
)
=
1
1 +
(
1
ω
) 1
θ2
.
Taking second derivatives it can be shown that G
(
1
ω
)
is convex for ω ≤
(
θ2
1−θ2
)θ2
and
concave for ω ≥
(
θ2
1−θ2
)θ2
.
Since convexity is invariant under affine maps, define 1z = d
n 1
ω + 1, and evaluate G
(
1
ω
)
in
1
z :
G
(
1
z
)
=
1
1 +
(
d−n
[
1
z − 1
]) 1
θ2
.
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Notice that the previous equation corresponds to the c.d.f. of Z defined in (A.2). Since the
mode of G
(
1
ω
)
is
(
θ2
1−θ2
)θ2
, the mode of G
(
1
z
)
is M = 1
dn
(
1
θ2
−1
)θ2
+1
. Additionally, G
(
1
z
)
is convex for z ∈ (0,M ] and concave for z ∈ [M, 1). Then z is unimodal about M .
Q.E.D.
Definition 2 A number m is said to be a median of Z if Pr [Z ≤ m] ≥ 12 and
Pr [Z ≥ m] ≤ 12 .
The median of the random variable Z is equal to
m =
1
dn + 1
. (A.3)
Definition 3 The max{Z −m, 0} is stochastically larger than −min{Z −m, 0}
if Pr [max{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′] ≥ Pr [−min{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′] for all z′, and for some
z′, Pr [max{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′] > Pr [−min{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′].
Proposition 4 Define m as the median of Z. The max{Z −m, 0} is stochastically larger
than −min{Z−m, 0}, when iceberg transport costs are strictly greater than one (i.e. d > 1).
Proof : The first condition of definition 3 can be rewritten as
Pr
[
Z ≥ z′ +m
]
Pr [Z ≥ m] + Pr
[
0 ≥ z′
]
Pr [Z < m] ≥
Pr
(
Z ≤ m− z′
]
Pr [Z < m] + Pr
[
0 ≥ z′
]
Pr [Z ≥ m] ,
which is equivalent to
1− Pr
[
Z ≤ z′ +m
]
≥ Pr
[
Z ≤ m− z′
]
. (A.4)
Case 1: |z′| < m < 1 −m. For this case, the strict inequality of equation (A.4) is proven.
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By contradiction suppose that
1− 1
1 + d
− n
θ2
(
1
z′+m − 1
) 1
θ2
≤ 1
1 + d
− n
θ2
(
1
m−z′ − 1
) 1
θ2
.
This equation can be simplified to
(1−m)2 − (z′)2 ≤ d2nm2 − d2n(z′)2.
By manipulating equation (A.3), the following equality is obtained: 1−m = mdn. Replacing
this equality in the previous step, the inequality changes to
d2n ≤ 1,
2n log(d) ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction for every d > 1 1.
Case 2: m ≤ |z′| < 1−m. Suppose equation (A.4) does not hold, then
1− Pr
[
Z ≤ z′ +m
]
< Pr
[
Z ≤ m− z′
]
≤ Pr [Z ≤ 0] ,
1− Pr
[
Z ≤ z′ +m
]
< 0,
Pr
[
Z ≤ z′ +m
]
> 1,
which is a contradiction, because Pr [Z ≤ z] ≤ 1 for all z.
Case 3: m < 1−m ≤ |z′|. Suppose equation (A.4) does not hold, then
1− Pr
[
Z ≤ z +m′
]
< Pr
[
Z ≤ m− z′
]
,
1− 1 < 0,
1By construction n > 1.
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which is a contradiction.
Then, Pr [max{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′] ≥ Pr [−min{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′] for all z′, and for |z′| < m,
Pr [max{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′] > Pr [−min{Z −m, 0} ≥ z′].
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 The median m of the random variable Z, as defined in (A.3), satisfies
m ≤ µ were µ is equal to to mean of Z, when trade costs are strictly larger than one (i.e.
d > 1).
Proof: Since Z is a unimodal random variable, and max{Z −m, 0} is stochastically larger
than −min{Z−m, 0} for d > 1, from Theorem 1.14 in Dharmadhikari and Joag-Dev (1988)
follows that m ≤ µ.
Q.E.D.
From proposition 5 follows that
m ≤ µ,
1
dn + 1
≤
∫ ∞
0
z dF (z, )
=
1
θ2
∫ ∞
0
1
dnν + 1
(ν)
1
θ2
−1[
1 + (ν)
1
θ2
]2 dν,
and thus proposition 1 is proven.
Q.E.D.
A.3. Latin American Database
Since 2002, the World Bank has collected firm-level data, through face-to-face interviews,
from top managers and business owners in over 130,000 companies in 135 countries. The
survey is applied to a representative sample of an economy’s private sector and covers a
broad range of business environment topics including access to finance, corruption, infras-
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Country
Year of Interview Total Observa-
tions2010 only 2006 only 2006 and 2010
Argentina 556 565 996 2,117
Bolivia 182 433 360 975
Chile 603 587 860 2,050
Colombia 636 694 612 1,942
Mexico 1,270 1,270 420 2,960
Panama 241 480 248 969
Paraguay 208 460 306 974
Peru 686 318 628 1,632
Uruguay 320 334 574 1,228
Venezuela 171 351 298 820
Total 4,873 5,492 5,302 15,667
Table 16: Enterprise Surveys Database
tructure, crime, competition, and performance measures The World Bank (2010).
In 2006 and 2010, a special set of questions were incorporated to the survey for ten Latin-
American countries. These questions are useful for the purposes of this paper, and therefore
I use this data set for the analysis.
The survey was applied to 5,492 firms in 2006 and to 4,873 firms in 2010, plus 2,651 firms
that were interviewed both years. Around a third of the firms are in the manufacturing
sector.
The following table classifies Latin-American firms according to their expansion strategies.
A.4. Variable Description
1. Pnit: Total patents grants direct and PCT national phase entries. Count by filing
office and applicants origin. Data from WIPO. Year Range: 1996-2011 - WIPO
2. Lit: Number of persons engaged (in millions) - Feenstra et al. (2013).
3. HKnt: Index of human capital per person. Average years of schooling and assumed
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Expansion Strategy Frequency Proportion Proportion
within group respect to Total
No Expansion Strategy 2,452 100 49.20
Imitation
Only Imitation 317 41.12 6.37
+ Local Innovation 260 33.72 5.23
+ Frontier Innovation 28 3.63 0.56
+ Local & Frontier Innovation 166 31.53 3.34
Total 771 100 15.50
Local Innovation
Only Local Innovation 1,406 65.55 28.26
+ Imitation 260 12.12 5.23
+ Frontier Innovation 313 14.59 6.29
+ Imitation & Frontier Innovation 166 7.74 3.34
Total 2,145 100 43.12
Frontier Innovation
Only Frontier Innovation 33 6.11 0.66
+ Imitation 28 5.19 0.56
+ Local Innovation 313 57.96 6.29
+ Imitation & Local Innovation 166 30.74 3.34
Total 540 100 10.85
Total Firms Sample 4,975 100 100
Table 17: Proportions of firms following Expansion Strategies
rate of return -Feenstra et al. (2013).
4. Kmni: Distance between capitals - Skrede
5. IMnit: Imports from country i to country n UN divided by Real GDP Feenstra et al.
(2013).
6. Rit: Researchers in R&D (per million people). Researchers in R&D are professionals
engaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods,
or systems and in the management of the projects concerned. Postgraduate PhD
students (ISCED97 level 6) engaged in R&D are included UNESCO.
7. yit: TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1) - Feenstra et al. (2013).
A.5. Calibration Database
1. Percentage Tertiary: percentage of the total population aged 15 and over that has
some tertiary education in 2010 Barro and Lee (2013)
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Country Percentage Tertiary Employment TFP
Argentina 0.1118 14.8714 0.6186
Bolivia 0.2078 3.8247 0.3761
Chile 0.1497 7.6967 0.6482
Colombia 0.2053 19.4002 0.4731
Mexico 0.1662 44.2049 0.7211
Panama 0.2208 1.4556 0.8347
Paraguay 0.0786 2.9187 0.343
Peru 0.1662 10.9482 0.5279
Uruguay 0.0763 1.5471 0.5481
Venezuela 0.1307 9.9661 0.6712
Table 18: Data used for calibration
2. Employment: number of persons engaged (in millions) in 2010- Feenstra et al. (2013).
3. TFP: TFP level at current PPPs (USA=1) 2010 - Feenstra et al. (2013).
A.6. Patents Database
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Low Human Capital
Office Observations
Brazil 626
China 780
China Macao SAR 196
Croatia 480
Egypt 638
Italy 745
Kyrgyz Republic 288
Mexico 757
Mongolia 410
Peru 532
Portugal 478
Sierra Leone 32
Spain 597
Thailand 445
Turkey 636
United Kingdom 741
Uruguay 375
Zimbabwe 206
Total 8,962
Middle Human Capital
Office Observations
Austria 545
Bulgaria 546
Chile 629
China Hong Kong SAR 773
Finland 629
France 685
Germany 735
Greece 656
Iceland 395
Kazakhstan 475
Latvia 500
Lithuania 516
Luxembourg 391
Malaysia 617
Malta 375
Poland 684
Republic of Moldova 367
Romania 611
Serbia 493
Switzerland 532
Tajikistan 275
Total 11,429
High Human Capital
Office Observations
Armenia 326
Australia 780
Belgium 600
Canada 782
Cyprus 230
Czech Republic 622
Denmark 470
Estonia 650
Hungary 604
Ireland 526
Israel 613
Japan 813
Netherlands 623
New Zealand 733
Norway 685
Republic of Korea 752
Russian Federation 779
Slovakia 574
Slovenia 490
Sweden 600
Ukraine 715
United States of America 850
Total 13,817
Table 19: Observations for the regression
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